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Abstract 
 
For many years, jurists have struggled to rationalise the common law rules which 
describe the circumstances in which it is justifiable to eschew the principle of 
separate legal personality which posits that a company is distinct from its members 
and managers. This is not particularly surprising. The central argument of this article 
is that in each of the cases where the piercing the veil doctrine has been considered 
by the courts, claimants have been seeking to harness it as a means of achieving three 
distinct objectives: first, setting aside the entity shielding feature of organisational 
law in order to permit the personal or business creditors of the owners (or beneficial 
owners) or directors (including de facto or shadow directors) of a registered company 
to seize the assets of the company in priority to the company’s creditors (‘outsider 
reverse veil piercing’); secondly, disregarding the institution of limited liability as a 
means of enabling the creditors of a registered company to seek recourse against the 
personal assets of the company’s owners (or beneficial owners) or directors in 
precedence to the personal or business creditors of that owner or director; finally, 
setting aside the separate legal personality of a registered company strictu sensu as a 
means of achieving an objective unconnected to the foregoing two factors. Once the 
implications of this are properly understood, an argument emerges which posits that 
it may be generally undesirable from a doctrinal perspective to permit the common 
law to set aside the entity shielding function of corporate law and that the application 
of the doctrine should be confined within limited bounds. 
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 4 
Introduction 
 
The doctrine which sanctions the piercing of the veil of incorporation undoubtedly 
represents one of the most prominent contributions which the common law has made 
to UK company law.
1
 The doctrine has evolved incrementally on a casuistic basis as a 
means of avoiding injustices generated as a result of the uncompromising decision of 
the House of Lords in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.
2
 which recognised the 
separate legal personality of companies, duly preferring form over substance. Whilst 
the common law cases demonstrate that the courts are far from enthusiastic about 
piercing the corporate veil to enable creditors or other third parties to obtain a remedy, 
it is not impregnable. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been subjected routinely to 
criticism. A common accusation is that it is unprincipled, unpredictable and arbitrary 
in its application. The upshot is that the lack of focus serves to confer too great a 
margin of discretion in favour of the courts. Further, it is argued that the ascription of 
discretionary licence to the judiciary is economically inefficient in that it increases 
transaction costs whilst securing no concomitant social benefits.
3
 A similar, related 
claim is that liberal approaches to veil piercing generate increased borrowing costs for 
an organisation.
4
 
                                                 
1
 Of course, there are instances where Parliament has intervened to enable the courts 
to look behind the cloak of incorporation to hold members or directors personally 
liable for the debts of the company or generally personally liable, e.g. there are 
various provisions in the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”) and the Insolvency Act 
1986 (section 767(3) and (4) of the Act (directors or officers of a plc), section 563(2) 
of the Act (directors or officers), section 213(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (directors 
or members) and section 76(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (members), inter alia. This 
paper is concerned with the circumstances which the common law (rather than 
Parliament) have treated as sufficient to disapply the veil. 
2
 [1897] A.C. 22. 
3
 SM Bainbridge, “Abolishing Veil Piercing” (2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 
479; SM Bainbridge, “Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing” (2005) University of Illinois 
Law Review 77; 
4
 E. Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (2
nd
 edition, Oxford, OUP, 2008) 
34; 
 5 
 
This article aims to make a modest contribution to the debate on the desirability of 
maintaining the doctrine as a central component of company law. Jurists have sought 
in vain to elicit some unifying theory which operates to clarify the circumstances in 
which the corporate veil has been set aside.
5
 Despite such efforts, the search for the 
juridical basis or bases for the doctrine has proven to be elusive and the cases where it 
has been applied are generally incapable of being coherently ordered into an 
organising framework.
6
 This article does not go so far as to call for the abolition of 
the doctrine.
7
 Instead, the central argument of this article is that the failure to elicit a 
satisfactory juridical theory for the doctrine is not particularly surprising when one 
recognises that in each of the cases where it has been considered by the courts, 
claimants have sought to harness it as a means of achieving three distinct objectives.
8
 
Once the implications of this are properly understood, an argument emerges which 
posits that it may be generally undesirable from a doctrinal perspective to permit the 
common law to set aside the entity shielding function of corporate law and that the 
application of the doctrine should be confined within more limited bounds than has 
hitherto been the case. 
 
                                                 
5
 The most recent persuasive attempt is by Moore who argues that the doctrine ought 
to be based normatively on a ‘genuine ultimate purpose’ test rather than the 
‘sham/façade’ ground articulated in the courts which he submits is doctrinally 
unsound, “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the 
Legacy of Salomon v Salomon” (2006) Journal of Business Law 180. See also S. 
Ottolenghi, "From Peeping behind the Corporate Veil to Ignoring it Completely" 
(1990) 53 Modern Law Review 33. 
6
 E. Ferran, n 4 above, 16-18. 
7
 For an exhaustive account of the arguments in favour of abolition from the 
viewpoint of the economic disadvantages of removing limited liability, see S. 
Bainbridge, n 3 above. 
8
 As stated by Cooke J in Kensington International Ltd. v Congo [2005] EWHC 2684 
(Comm); [2006] 2 B.C.L.C. 296, 341 at para. 177, the “meaning of the expression 
[‘piercing the corporate veil’] and its out-working differs in the various contexts of 
the authorities concerned.” 
 6 
Entity Shielding, Limited Liability and Separate Legal Personality 
 
This section seeks to address the import of the terms ‘entity shielding’, ‘limited 
liability’ and ‘separate legal personality’ and the significance of these factors to the 
corporate, organisational and legal forms and institutions which are available to 
persons seeking to engage in commercial enterprise. Once these attributes of the 
corporate form are understood and organisations and institutions recognised by law 
are measured and analysed against them, they inform our understanding of, and 
furnish an alternative perspective against which, the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil can be evaluated. To that extent, this section is engaged in a descriptive exercise. 
 
First, with regard to ‘entity shielding’, Hansmann and Kraakman have referred to it as 
‘the sine qua non of the legal entity’,
9
 i.e. that without it, a company could not subsist 
as a separate juristic person.
10
 Nevertheless, suffice to say at this juncture that entity 
shielding arises in three particular forms, namely ‘weak entity shielding’, ‘strong 
entity shielding’ and ‘complete entity shielding’. In the case of the former, the 
personal or commercial creditors of the owners, directors or managers of an 
organisation have rights of execution, levy and diligence over the assets of the 
organisation insofar as the obligations of such owners, directors or managers remain 
unfulfilled, but those rights of recourse are deferred to the rights of the creditors of the 
organisation itself.
11
 An organisation which exhibits strong entity shielding is one 
which combines the principle of liquidation protection alongside weak entity 
shielding. The notion of liquidation protection is channelled through various rule of 
law which are to the effect that an owner, director or manager is disentitled from 
forcing the organisation to pay out his share of that organisation at will.
12
 In company 
                                                 
9
 H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman and R. Squire, ‘Law and the Rise of the Firm’ (2006) 
119 Harvard Law Review 1333, 1338. 
10
 It will be argued below that this statement is perhaps taking matters too far. 
11
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1337-1338; H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 387, 394-395. 
12
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1338; H. Hansmann et al, n 11 above, 394-395. 
 7 
law, the capital maintenance principle,
13
 the requirement for a super-majority to wind 
up and dissolve a company
14
 and the rule which restricts corporate distributions to 
being paid out of accumulated, realised profits less accumulated realised losses,
15
 are 
three particular examples of liquidation protection. Suffice to say for the purposes of 
this paper that we are concerned with ‘complete entity shielding’, which is a 
characteristic of the registered company under the Act: 
 
“Complete entity shielding denies non-firm creditors – including creditors of 
the firm's (beneficial) owners, if any - any claim to firm assets... The personal 
creditors of the managers and beneficiaries of such an organization do not 
enjoy any claim to its assets, which only bond contractual commitments made 
in the name of the organization itself.”
16
 
 
All companies incorporated under the UK Companies Acts and Corporate Codes and 
laws in other European countries and North American States, inter alia, possess the 
characteristic of complete entity shielding, which is one of the defining and unique 
characteristics of the company. As Hansmann and Kraakman have argued
17
 and 
Armour and Whincop have developed,
18
 there are certain features of corporate law 
which could not be replicated by a series of interlinked contracts which ascribe 
                                                 
13
 The rules in In re Exchange Banking Company (Flitcroft’s Case) (1882) LR 21 Ch 
D 519 and Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409, HL (now subject to section 
690 of the Companies Act 2006) to the effect that the capital of the company must not 
be returned to the shareholders subject to limited recognised exceptions. See also 
articles 19 to 24 of the Second European Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC) (as 
amended by Directive 2006/68/EC). 
14
 In the UK, see section 84(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
15
 Section 830 of the Companies Act 2006 and articles 15 to 16 of the Second 
European Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC) (as amended by Directive 
2006/68/EC). 
16
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1338. 
17
 H. Hansmann et al, n 11 above, 407-408. 
18
 J. Armour and M. Whincop, “The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law” 
(2007) 27 OJLS 429. 
 8 
contractual rights and obligations amongst the natural persons residing behind, and 
dealing with, the artificial construct of the corporation (e.g. directors, minority 
shareholders, majority shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, etc.). 
Instead those features require rigid property rules to be promulgated through law to 
enable them to arise.
19
 These rules serve to highlight the proprietary foundations of 
company law. Complete entity shielding, whereby the assets, and property rights to 
the assets, of the company, shareholders and directors are rigidly compartmentalised 
and partitioned is one of those features of the company which it has been persuasively 
argued cannot be mirrored by multilateral contracting alone.
20
 
 
Limited liability is the mirror image of entity shielding. It operates to disentitle the 
creditors of an organisation from having recourse against the assets of the 
organisation’s owners, directors or managers for claims which the creditors of the 
organisation have against that organisation. Like entity shielding, limited liability 
(what Hansmann and Kraakman have referred to as ‘defensive asset partitioning’ or 
‘owner shielding’)
21
 may be divided into weak and strong forms. The weak form of 
owner shielding gives the personal creditors of the owners, directors or managers of 
an organisation a right of recourse against the personal assets of those constituencies 
for its claims in priority to the creditors of the organisation. Thus, whilst the creditors 
of the organisation have a right to levy or execute against the personal assets of the 
owners, directors or managers of the organisation, that right is deferred to the claims 
of the personal or commercial creditors of such owners, directors or managers. 
Meanwhile strong owner shielding deprives the creditors of the organisation from any 
right of recourse against the personal assets of the organisation’s owners, directors or 
managers and they may only levy execution against the assets of the organisation. 
Finally, the term ‘separate legal personality’ is simply a reference to the 
                                                 
19
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1339 and 1340-1343. 
20
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1340-1343; H. Hansmann et al, n 11 above, 407-408; 
J. Armour and M. Whincop, n 18 above, 431; J. Armour, H. Hansmann and R. 
Kraakman, “What is Corporate Law” in R. Kraakman, J. Armour et al, The Anatomy 
of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (2
nd
 edition, Oxford, 
OUP, 2009) 6-9. 
21
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1339-1340 H. Hansmann et al, n 11 above, 395-396. 
 9 
personification of an organisation which is distinct from its members, owners and 
managers, i.e. that it resides within the private law category of the law of persons, 
rather than obligations, things (property) or remedies. A common misconception is 
that it is only possible for entity shielding and limited liability to arise in the event that 
an organisation possesses the feature of distinct legal personality, i.e. that it is only 
because the corporation can be personified that it can own its assets
22
 and the 
shareholders and directors have limited liability. However, as will be demonstrated in 
the next section, this is a fallacy since each of these three categories are mutually 
exclusive and none of them are parasitic in the sense that they rely on the continued 
existence of the others for their recognition or survival. 
 
The Relationship between Entity Shielding, Limited Liability and Separate Legal 
Personality 
 
It is submitted that none of the institutions of entity shielding, limited liability or 
separate legal personality are sufficient nor necessary for the others to arise. Each is 
mutually exclusive and may arise and function in isolation. Instead, the term ‘separate 
legal personality’ is a useful concept in the sense of a leitmotif which assists lawyers 
when they think about the division of assets, and the division of rights to assets, 
amongst companies and their shareholders and directors.
23
 Entity shielding and 
limited liability are associated with the concept of separate juristic personality, but the 
latter is by no means a prerequisite for the establishment of both of the former. For 
example, it is possible for a legal institution to possess both entity shielding and 
limited liability without separate legal personality. Prior to the coming into force of 
the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and the Limited Liability Act 1855 which 
established the modern company with strong entity shielding and limited liability, 
private law mechanisms had been harnessed by practising lawyers to create 
                                                 
22
 That the company owns its own assets is articulated in the speech of Lord 
Buckmaster in Macaura v Northern Assurance Company [1925] AC 619 (Privy 
Council), 626 and the fact that a share owned by a shareholder does not confer any 
property right in the assets of the company, Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 
KB 116, 122 per Evershed LJ.  
23
 J. Armour and M. Whincop, n 18 above, 461. 
 10 
unincorporated joint stock companies possessing the lion’s share of those very 
features. Such organisations were essentially a highly complex amalgam of large 
partnerships and trusts whereby the assets of the partnership were vested in trustees 
selected by the partners in terms of a deed of settlement. Since it had been established 
by the late 17
th
 century or early 18
th
 century
24
 that the personal creditors of trustees 
could not levy execution against the trust assets of the trustees and that the personal 
creditors of the trust beneficiaries could not force the liquidation of the assets of the 
trust estate, the benefit of ‘bolting’ the trust onto the partnership was that the 
organisation would enjoy strong entity shielding.
25
 Further, limited liability was 
secured by inserting clauses in the terms and conditions of contracts with creditors of 
the joint stock company, using the word ‘limited’ in the name of the joint stock 
company and specifying limited liability on all official documentation and in 
contracts with third parties.
26
 In the same vein as modern companies, some joint stock 
companies effectively had transferable shares, perpetual succession and specialised 
management restricted to a limited number of trustees. 
 
In order to further substantiate the claim that each of the institutions of entity 
shielding, limited liability and separate legal personality are distinct, it is useful to 
contrast the Scottish and English partnerships. In the case of the former, the effect of 
the combination of section 4(2) of the Partnership Act 1890 and the institutional 
writer Bell’s observations
27
 is such that it is abundantly clear that the partnership in 
Scots law is a separate juristic person possessing weak entity shielding (at the very 
                                                 
24
 See Crane v Drake (1708) 2 Vern. 616, Ellis’s Case (1742) 1 Atk. 101. 
25
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1383-1384. 
26
 This technique was effective in the case of trust law, see J. Sears, Trust Estates as 
Business Companies (2
nd
 edn., Kansas City, Vernon Law Book Company, 1921, 
reprinted by The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. Union, New Jersey, 1998) paras. 39 and 
54-56 at pages 53-54 and 74-82. 
27
 Bell, Commentaries, II, 507-508 (7
th
 edition from 1870 by M’Laren); Erskine 
Institute II, 744; Commissioners of Treasury v M’Nair, Faculty Collection, 14 Feb, 
1809 and Hume’s Lectures Vol. II, at pp. 172, 177 and 183-184. 
 11 
least). This rule probably emerged ‘some time after 1773… [but] before 1800’.
28
 
There is something quite beguiling about the fact that there are a number of Scots law 
cases from the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century which concern the 
circumstances in which it was appropriate to set aside the personification of the 
partnership in order to confer benefits on a partnership or the partners of a partnership 
in actions raised by creditors of a partner or a partnership against a partner or 
partnership.
29
 Indeed, such an issue often arose where the set-off (known as 
‘compensation’ and ‘balancing of accounts in bankruptcy’ in Scots law) of debts to 
and from the partnership and the partners was at issue,
30
 since it was crucial to 
identify whether debts were owed to or by individual partners or partnerships in 
respect of which such individuals were also partners.
31
 Further, a fortiori, the effect of 
                                                 
28
 P. Hemphill, “The Personality of the Partnership in Scotland” (1984) Juridical 
Review 208, 216. 
29
 Bell, Commentaries, II, 515-516 (7
th
 edition from 1870 by M’Laren); Mackie v 
M’Dowall 1774 M. 2575 (piercing argument rejected and so a partnership was not 
entitled to secure a benefit which would have enabled it to set off a debt due by a 
creditor to a partner against debts due by the partnership to the same creditor); 
Bertram, Gardner & Co.’s Case, 25
th
 February, 1795 (unreported); Williams’ Trs. v 
Inglis, Borthwick Gilchrist & Co., 13
th
 June 1809, Faculty Collection (veil pierced to 
provide a benefit to partnership 1 by allowing it to set off sums due by one of its 
creditors to partnership 2 against sums due by partnership 1 to the same creditor, on 
the basis that the partners of both partnerships were the same individuals); Bogle and 
Bannatyne, 8
th
 February, 1793 (veil pierced to enable partner to secure a benefit by 
allowing the set off a debt due to him by a creditor of the partnership against a debt 
due by the partnership to the same creditor);  P. Hemphill, n 28 above, 235. The 
general rule appears to have been that the commercial objectives of the firms needed 
to be essentially different for the creditors of a partner of both or all of those firms to 
be disentitled from setting aside the separate legal personality of those partnerships. 
30
 Bell, Commentaries, II, 553 (7
th
 edition from 1870 by M’Laren); M’Ghie v 
M’Dowall 1774 M. 2575. 
31
 On the basis of the concursus crediti et debiti doctrine. For a sharp contrast, see 
Ritchie Ltd. v Union Transit Co. (1915) 32 Sh.Ct.Rep. 55 where it was held that the 
veil piercing technique was unavailable to permit a director to set off a debt due by his 
 12 
the rule in Moss v Elphick
32
 - which it is understood also applies in Scots law
33
 - is 
such that the Scottish partnership exhibits strong entity shielding in circumstances 
where the partnership agreement declares that it is to endure for a fixed term
34
 since it 
is not competent for a personal creditor of a partner to execute the form of diligence 
(i.e. the Scots law equivalent of execution or distress) known as adjudication over the 
assets of a partnership of definite duration.
35
 Instead, those creditors have the power 
to execute the diligence of arrestment over the partner’s share in the partnership only 
and are unable to force the liquidation of the partnership’s assets by exercising the 
                                                                                                                                            
creditor to a company (of which he was director) against a debt due by him to the 
same creditor. 
32
 [1910] 1 K.B. 846. Walters v Bingham (1988) 138 NLJ Law Reports 7. 
33
 In its Joint Consultation and Discussion Paper on Partnership Law reform, at 
various points where Moss v Elphick was mentioned, the Scottish Law Commission 
did not qualify matters to suggest that the rule in this case did not apply in Scots law, 
see Law Commission (Consultation Paper No. 159) and Scottish Law Commission 
(Discussion Paper No. 111), Joint Consultation Paper on Partnership Law, paras. 
2.27, 6.8 and 6.18 at pages 12, 58 and 61. 
34
 Bell, Commentaries, II, 523 (7
th
 edition from 1870 by M’Laren); Partnership Act 
1890, ss 26, 32, 33; Moss v Elphick [1910] 1 KB 846; Law Commission (Consultation 
Paper No. 159) and Scottish Law Commission (Discussion Paper No. 111), Joint 
Consultation Paper on Partnership Law, para. 2.28 at page 12. Interestingly, Burgess 
and Morse suggest that strong entity shielding may also be present where the 
partnership is at will since the Scottish courts have never ‘pronounced upon whether 
the arresting creditor has the power to dissolve the partnership either at his own hand 
or by compelling his debtor to exercise his right to do so’, R. Burgess and G. Morse, 
Partnership Law and Practice in England and Scotland (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1980) 170. 
35
 Indeed, Clark opined that it might even not be possible in the case of a partnership 
at will, F. W Clark, The Law of Partnership and Joint Stock Companies according to 
the Law of Scotland (T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1866), Vol I, p 630-631. 
 13 
subsequent diligence of furthcoming.
36
 The end result is that a ‘judgment creditor 
cannot [force] a division of the firm’s assets until the partnership itself is dissolved.’
37
 
 
Turning to the partnership governed by English law, it possesses the same 
characteristic of weak entity shielding as the Scots partnership by virtue of the case of 
Craven v Knight.
38
 Craven held that the creditors of a bankrupt partnership have first 
claim over the assets of that partnership and the personal creditors only have a claim 
over any surplus left over. Meanwhile, abolishing the old common law rule,
39
 section 
23(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 provides that execution cannot be levied by a 
personal creditor against partnership property for the separate debt of a partner. 
Instead, in terms of section 23(2) of the Partnership Act 1890, that partner’s interest in 
                                                 
36
 Erskine III, 3.24. 
37
 P. Hemphill, n 28 above, 228. However, the fact that strong entity shielding in the 
Scots partnership of fixed duration is not absolute should not be overlooked. For 
example, the creditors of the partnership may attempt to respond to an express term in 
the partnership agreement of that kind by engineering a situation which removes 
strong entity shielding by successfully petitioning for the bankruptcy of a partner, 
whereupon the partnership will be dissolved automatically and its assets wound up in 
terms of the Partnership Act 1890, s. 33(1). 
38
 (1683) 21 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch.). See H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1381; J. Getzler 
and M. McNair, The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts in P Brand, K 
Costello and W N Osborough (eds), Adventures of the Law: Proceedings of the 
Sixteenth British Legal History Conference, Dublin, 2003 (Four Courts Press, Dublin, 
2005) 267, 278 available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941231. 
39
 Historically, in English law and the law of the states of the US, it was possible for a 
judgment creditor of a partner to levy execution and seize the tangible assets of the 
partnership, see Rt. Hon. Sir N. Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnership (5
th
 
edition, W. Maxwell & Son, London, 1888) 356; J. Story, Commentaries on the Law 
of Partnership as a Branch of Maritime Jurisprudence (7
th
 edn., Boston, Little Brown 
& Co. 1881 reprinted by The Law Book Exchange, Ltd, Clark, New Jersey, 2007) 
para. 261 at pp. 403-405. 
 14 
the partnership may be charged in terms of a charging order.
40
 If the partnership is at 
will (i.e. of no fixed duration) and the other partners elect under section 33(2) of the 
Partnership Act 1890 to dissolve the partnership for the reason that the partner’s share 
has been charged, the personal creditors of the partner whose share has been charged 
will be entitled to force a pay out from the partnership assets, i.e. there will be no 
strong entity shielding in that case. However, akin to Scots law, the case of Moss v 
Elphick
41
 is effective to provide for strong entity shielding in the case of an English 
partnership where its duration is expressed to be for a fixed term in a partnership 
agreement and a partner’s interest in the partnership has been charged in terms of a 
charging order.
42
 However, unlike the Scottish partnership, in terms of Sadler v 
Whiteman, English law directs that the partnership or firm is nothing more than an 
expression. Hence, in English law, the partnership may have the attribute of weak or 
strong entity shielding (depending on the terms of the partnership agreement) without 
any separate juristic personhood. 
 
It is also possible in practice for an organisation to possess the attributes of separate 
legal personality and limited liability without entity shielding. For example, consider 
a private company limited by shares or a plc with one shareholder. In such a case, the 
creditor of the shareholder may wield sufficient power over that shareholder which 
enables it to effectively undertake execution (in England) or exercise diligence (in 
Scotland) over the assets of the company. This can be achieved by the inclusion of 
appropriately worded covenants in the loan agreement between the creditor and the 
shareholder, whereupon it is provided that the shareholder is obliged to pass a special 
resolution under section 84(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to voluntarily wind up 
                                                 
40
 See the discussion in Halsbury’s Laws of England, (5
th
 edn., 2008) Vol. 79 
‘Partnership’ at paras. 95-96, pp. 61-62. The charging order is enforceable by the 
creditor by securing the appointment of a receiver or by an order for sale of the 
partner’s share. Nevertheless, like the Scottish partnership, the creditors can 
effectively discard this strong entity shielding feature by taking steps to make a 
partner individually bankrupt, since section 33(1) of the Partnership Act 1890 applies. 
41
 [1910] 1 K.B. 846. 
42
 See the discussion in Halsbury’s Laws of England, (5
th
 edn., 2008) Vol. 79 
‘Partnership’ at paras. 95-96, pp. 61-62.  
 15 
the company on the occurrence of certain events. Such a contractual scheme 
facilitates the release of the shareholder’s share of the assets of that organisation on 
demand at the behest of that shareholder’s creditors. In such circumstances, the 
liquidation protection mechanisms in company law - such as the provisions which 
require the super-majority (i.e. a special resolution) approval of the shareholders for 
the winding-up of the assets of the company and the rules which represent 
manifestations of the capital maintenance principle duly disempowering both 
shareholders and their personal and business creditors from compelling the company 
to pay out the shareholder’s share from the net assets of the company – are deprived 
effectively of any force. Whilst the capital maintenance principle remains intact, the 
shareholder in such a company can easily bypass it. It is conceivable that the scenario 
portrayed above could easily be replicated in circumstances where there were a 
limited number of shareholders in a company rather than simply one. 
 
Furthermore, separate legal personality is not necessary for entity shielding to arise. 
Here, it is worthwhile recalling that an English partnership at will boasts a weak form 
of entity shielding in the absence of separate legal personality and limited liability. 
Such entity shielding may be converted to strong entity shielding by transforming the 
partnership at will to one of fixed duration, whereupon the rule in Moss v Elphick
43
 
applies to disentitle a partner or his/her personal or commercial creditors from 
liquidating the partner’s share of the assets of the partnership. Furthermore, the rules 
of property law in jurisdictions bearing a civil law tradition are sufficiently flexible to 
enable a particular juristic person to partition his assets into separate or multiple asset 
pools without assigning any juristic personality to such asset pools.
44
 The asset pools 
are referred to as separate special purpose patrimonies (“special purpose 
patrimonies”) and so as long as they are committed or set aside towards the 
achievement of a specific objective and the property law principles of specificity
45
 
                                                 
43
 [1910] 1 K.B. 846. 
44
 G. Elgueta, “Divergences and Convergences of Common Law and Civil Law 
Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis”, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1395342. 
45
 The rule that the property in the pool or fund should be clearly identifiable for real, 
third party effects to arise. 
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and numerus clausus
46
 are respected, the personal creditors of the juristic person will 
have no right or power to seize the assets or funds falling within those special purpose 
patrimonies. There are convincing arguments that the Scots law trust functions on the 
basis of the notion of split patrimonies whereby the trust assets owned by the trustee 
are ring-fenced from attack at the hands of the trustee’s personal or commercial 
creditors and the latter are unable to force the trustee to liquidate the trust assets as a 
means of redeeming individual or commercial debts.
47
 To that extent, where special 
purpose patrimonies arise, strong and complete entity shielding without separate legal 
personality and limited liability is the norm. There is no limited liability since the 
juristic person is personally liable out of his own private patrimony to the creditors or 
beneficiaries of a special purpose patrimony in the event that there are insufficient 
funds or assets therein to satisfy the debts of such creditors or claims of such 
beneficiaries. However, in much the same fashion as the techniques adopted by 
unincorporated joint stock companies in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, it is possible and 
extremely common for a juristic person through contracting and public notices to 
                                                 
46
 This mandatory principle posits that there is a closed list of circumstances in which 
it is possible for separate patrimonies to be crafted due to the real, third party 
consequences which arise and that it is impossible to add to the list by contract alone, 
See S. Bartels et al. in S Bartels and M Milo, Contents of Real Rights, 12-22, 29-31, 
99-113, 115-147, 149-150 and T.W. Merrill and H.E. Smith, ‘The Numerus Clausus 
Principle’, 11 Yale Law Journal 1 (2000), 3. 
47
 G L Gretton "Trusts without Equity" (2000) 49 ICLQ 599; K G C Reid "Patrimony 
Not Equity: the Trust in Scotland" (2000) 8 European Review of Private Law 427. 
However, this is a theory and there is no common law or legislative support for it. 
However, the Scottish Law Commission have suggested that the dual patrimony 
model be put on a statutory footing by legislation, see Discussion Paper No. 133, The 
Nature and Constitution of Trusts 
(http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/dp133_trusts.pdf), paras. 2.16-2.28 at 
pages 10-13 and Discussion Paper No. 138, Discussion Paper on Liability of Trustees 
to Third Parties (http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/dps/dp138.pdf), paras. 
1.3-1.11 at pages 1-4. 
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engender limited liability vis-à-vis such special purpose patrimony creditors.
48
 Thus, 
unlimited personal liability is a default rule and the parties are free to contract around 
it. The point is clearly pronounced when one considers the relevance of limited 
liability in the context of the lack of separate legal personality of the special purpose 
patrimony. The discrete special purpose patrimonies enjoy no separate legal 
personality, since the creditors of each have no right to enforce or take action against 
the patrimonies themselves. Rather, the claims of those creditors amount to personal 
rights of enforcement against the juristic person holding, administering or which is 
responsible for, those assets, albeit that the extent of the latter’s liability will be 
commonly limited by contract to the assets or funds in each special purpose 
patrimony – rather than extending to the juristic person’s individual assets or 
patrimony. 
 
Implications for the Doctrine on Piercing the Corporate Veil 
 
The above discussion serves to inform our understanding of the piercing the veil 
doctrine since there is a predisposition to treat each of the cases where it has been 
invoked as being pre-occupied with the setting aside of the limited liability feature of 
companies in order to transfer liability onto shareholders and directors.
49
 Instead, as 
Kershaw has correctly noted,
50
 this is too simplistic an approach. The doctrine should 
be analysed in terms of what it definitionally and inherently purports to achieve, i.e. 
that it functions to explain the circumstances in which the institution of separate 
juristic personality of the company will be ignored. On this basis, much of the case 
law on the doctrine of piercing the veil can be examined in a new light, since from the 
                                                 
48
 For example, in Scots law, see Gordon v Campbell (1842) 1 Bell’s App. 428 and 
Brown v Sutherland (1875) 2 R. 615, 621 per Lord Gifford where it was held that the 
trust estate was liable where this was expressly stipulated in a contract. In England, 
the same proposition applies, see Lumsden v Buchanan (1865) 4 M 950, 955 per Lord 
Westbury LC, Williams v Hathaway (1877) 6 Ch.D 544 and Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, (4
th
 edn., 2001) Vol. 48, ‘Trusts’, para. 1080. 
49
 S. Bainbridge, n 3 above, 481 and 487; E. Ferran, n 4 above 16; B. Hannigan, 
Company Law (2
nd
 edition, OUP, 2009) 57. 
50
 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (OUP, 2009) 46. 
 18 
earlier discussion, it is clear that disregarding the personification of the company does 
not lead to the personal liability of shareholders or directors as a logical necessity. 
The preceding discussion relating to the entity shielding feature of companies may 
also function to assist in pinpointing the circumstances in which the veil of 
incorporation ought to, and ought not to, be pierced, ignored or set aside as a means of 
developing a unifying theory, i.e. the insights which emerge perform a normative, 
rather than descriptive function. At this juncture, some initial description of the 
current legal position is required in order to put the ensuing normative arguments 
within some context.  
 
For such descriptive purposes, it is necessary to briefly engage with the circumstances 
where it is commonly understood that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil will 
be applied. First, it is often narrated that the doctrine will be available where the 
corporate veil is such that it is a ‘mere façade concealing the true facts.’
51
 Alternative 
language for this proposition is where the veil of incorporation is exposed as a ‘device 
or sham or cloak’.
52
 A second category of cases are rationalised on the basis that they 
confer support for a proposition that the doctrine will be applicable where the 
company has been formed to evade existing legal obligations. For example, in Jones v 
Lipman,
53
 where a company had been incorporated to frustrate the performance of a 
contract for the sale of land entered into between the company’s individual 
shareholder/director and the latter’s creditor, the court harnessed the doctrine as a 
means of granting to the creditor an order for specific performance against the 
shareholder/director and the company. Likewise, in Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v Horne,
54
 
a creditor of an individual was entitled to an injunction where the individual (through 
his wife) had incorporated and used a company to breach an obligation owed to the 
                                                 
51
 Woolfson v Strathclyde R.C. 1978 SC (HL) 90, 96 per Lord Keith of Kinkel; Adams 
v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 539-541 per Slade LJ; Trustor AB v Smallbone 
(No. 2) [2001] 3 All ER 987, 995f-h per Sir Andrew Morritt V-C. 
52
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 540 per Slade LJ. 
53
 [1962] 1 All ER 442. 
54
 [1933] Ch. 935. 
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creditor. Thirdly, grounds such as ‘impropriety/mala fides’,
55
 ‘the interests of 
justice’
56
 or ‘single economic unit’
57
 without more, do not provide sufficient 
explanatory force in themselves for the doctrine. Neither does the agency doctrine 
represent a ground for the doctrine since it presupposes the existence of the separate 
personification of the company as a means of transferring liability onto a third party. 
 
Given the difficulties in reconciling the somewhat overlapping and conflicting 
relationship between the ‘mere façade concealing the true facts’ and ‘evasion of 
existing legal obligations’ bases for the doctrine,
58
 it has fallen to doctrinal analysis to 
seek to forge a normative reconceptualisation of the circumstances in which the 
doctrine should be applied. For example, Moore has argued that the doctrine ought to 
be capable of uniform explanation in terms of an overarching theory to the effect that 
it is applied where a company is not performing a genuine business purpose and 
instead was formed with some ulterior motives. Whilst attractive, this appears to be a 
variant of the ‘impropriety/mala fides’ ground which was rejected in Trustor. Further, 
as Kershaw argues, this formulation ‘does not capture the circumstances in which the 
courts have pierced the veil on the ‘mere corporate name’ basis… [since] it is clear 
that using the corporate form to perform a pure liability reduction function, in the 
                                                 
55
 Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 2) [2001] 3 All ER 987, 995f per Sir Andrew Morritt 
V-C. 
56
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 536 per Slade LJ; Ord v Belhaven 
Pubs Ltd. [1998] EWCA Civ 243; [1998] BCC 607, 614-615 per Hobhouse LJ; 
Trustor AB v Smallbone (No. 2) [2001] 3 All ER 987, 995c-e per Sir Andrew Morritt 
V-C. 
57
 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 539-538 per Slade LJ. 
58
 For example, where a company is formed in order to limit a shareholder’s potential 
or anticipated future obligations, this is perfectly legal in terms of Adams v Cape 
Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 544 per Slade LJ. The difficulty arises where it comes 
to drawing the line between existing and anticipated obligations or liabilities, on 
which see Raja v Van Hoogstraten [2006] EWHC 2654 (Ch) at para. 31 per Pumfrey 
J. 
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absence of any separate corporate purpose, would not result in piercing under this 
category.’
59
 
 
It is submitted that the challenges confronting the doctrinal search for a unifying 
proposition of normative force which serves to explain and guide the future 
engagement of the doctrine in subsequent cases are not insignificant. Such challenges 
are attributable to the fact that the doctrine is seeking to achieve three distinct 
objectives in each of the cases where it has been relied upon. First, it is used to justify 
the removal of the ‘entity shielding’ feature of incorporated companies as a means of 
permitting the creditors of the shareholders (or beneficial shareholders) or directors 
(including de facto or shadow directors) of the company to seize the assets of the 
company or have residual recourse over those assets as security for an actual or 
contingent claim against those shareholders or directors (‘outsider reverse veil 
piercing’). Secondly, as has been routinely discussed and documented,
60
 the doctrine 
is applied to remove the ‘limited liability’ feature of modern company law to enable 
creditors of the company or other third parties to seize the assets of shareholders (or 
beneficial shareholders) or directors (including de facto or shadow directors) of the 
company or take security over those assets for an actual or contingent claim against 
the company.
61
 Finally, there is a category of cases where the courts ignore or set 
aside the separate legal personality of the company strictu sensu (A) in order to confer 
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 D. Kershaw, n 49 above 77. 
60
 R. Grantham, “Commentary on Goddard”  in R. Grantham and C. Rickett, (eds), 
Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Oxford: Hart, 1998) 65 and D. Prentice, 
“Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors” in R. 
Grantham and C. Rickett, (eds), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Oxford: 
Hart, 1998) 99; S. Bainbridge, n 3 above, 481 and 487; E. Ferran, n 4 above 16; B. 
Hannigan, n 48 above, 57. 
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 Some of the most relevant cases are Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433, 
Yukong Lines Ltd. of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia, The 
Rialto (No. 2) [1998] 4 All ER 82 and Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd. [1998] EWCA Civ 
243; [1998] BCC 607, but there are many others. 
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benefits on (i) the company,
62
 or (ii) third parties legally connected in some way to the 
company (such as parent companies, subsidiary companies, companies in the same 
corporate group, shareholders
63
 or directors) or (iii) third party creditors who are not 
so legally connected where the benefit accruing to that third party does not entail 
having actual or potential recourse to the assets of a debtor who is a shareholder of a 
company or the company itself or (B) for some other purpose which does not entail 
the removal of entity shielding or limited liability, e.g. the ‘mere corporate name’ 
basis referred to by Kershaw above. This article is not so much concerned with the 
justifications for and against the application of the doctrine to remove limited liability, 
since those arguments have been well-versed and debated by commentators.
64
 Suffice 
to say that those arguments possess a considerable degree of traction, inasmuch as the 
doctrine is being applied in such cases in order to set aside limited liability rather than 
separate legal personality. Removing limited liability does not necessarily entail the 
disregard of the personification of the company - that necessarily follows from the 
submission above that these categories are mutually exclusive. Instead, the focus of 
attention will be on the circumstances in which the common law courts apply the 
doctrine as a means of disregarding entity shielding, since this is a particular area 
which has been under-researched. 
 
Applying the Doctrine to Set Aside Entity Shielding 
 
The cases which concern the application of the doctrine sanctioning the piercing of 
the corporate veil can be classified into two particular groups. First, there are cases 
                                                 
62
 For example, the right of set off. For old cases on piercing the separate legal 
personality of Scottish partnerships in such a context, see n 29 above. 
63
 In the US, where a shareholder is entitled to pierce the corporate veil as a means of 
securing a benefit, this is known as ‘reverse veil piercing’, on which see the case of 
State Bank v. Euerle Farms, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. App. 1989), discussed in S. 
Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (New York, Foundation Press, 2002) 
165-168. 
64
 See S. Bainbridge, n 3 above and S. Bainbridge n 61 above at Chapter 4. 
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such as Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No.1),
65
 Kensington International Ltd. 
v Congo,
66
 The “Tjaskemolen”,
67
 Raja v Van Hoogstraten
68
 and others
69
 where the 
doctrine is advanced as a justification for the removal of the ‘entity shielding’ feature 
of incorporated companies. The significance of lifting the veil in such circumstances 
is that it functions to permit the personal or commercial creditors of the shareholders 
(or beneficial shareholders) of the company to seize the assets of the company as a 
means of settling a debt, claim or liability. In the US, this approach has been labelled 
‘outsider reverse veil-piercing’
70
 and is recognised as a legitimate cause of action in 
various US states. For example, in the case of Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. 
                                                 
65
 [1980] 1 WLR 627. Here, the creditors of a parent company sought to gain access 
to documents held by subsidiary companies in South Africa and Rhodesia, but the 
claim was rejected. 
66
 [2005] EWHC 2684 (Comm); [2006] 2 B.C.L.C. 296. This case concerned a series 
of sales and purchases amongst connected companies which had a relationship with 
the Congo or the President of the Congo State Oil Company. The application of the 
doctrine enabled a creditor of the Congo to seize the assets of companies it controlled 
directly or indirectly (through the President of the Congo State Oil Company). 
67
 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465. Here, in anticipation of the initiation of an arbitration 
claim and the arrestment of a vessel in security for the arbitration claim by a creditor, 
a company transferred the vessel to another company in the corporate group pursuant 
to a memorandum of agreement. 
68
 [2006] EWHC 2564 (Ch). 
69
 Re K and others; Re M plc and others [2005] EWCA Crim 619; [2006] BCC 362 is 
a case based on the application of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.80(3) involving 
fraud where entity shielding was removed. 
70
 S. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (New York, Foundation Press, 
2002) 167-168; L. Heilman, “C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Limited Partnership: Will 
the Virginia Supreme Court Permit Outsider Reverse Veil-Piercing Against a Limited 
Partnership?” (2003) 28 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 619; L. Ribstein, 
“Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations” (2005) 30 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 199, 216-219;  
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Howell,
71
 the personal creditors of an individual debtor who owned 97% of the shares 
of a limited liability company (“LLC”)
72
 were entitled to apply the doctrine as a 
means of reaching the assets of the LLC. The second group of cases are slightly 
different and provide the personal or commercial creditors of the shareholders (or 
beneficial shareholders) of a company with a right of residual recourse over the assets 
of the company as a form of security for an actual or contingent claim against those 
legal or beneficial shareholders. This is an indirect form of ‘outsider reverse veil 
piercing’ since it is only if the creditor’s right of residual recourse is exercised that the 
assets of the company are seized and direct outsider reverse veil piercing arises. For 
example, in Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v Horne,
73
 a creditor of a beneficial shareholder of 
a company was successful in securing an injunction against that individual and the 
company for a breach of the individual’s existing personal obligations. In the event 
that an injunction is breached by a beneficial shareholder in such circumstances, the 
creditor in whose favour the injunction has been granted would be entitled to exercise 
a right of recourse against the assets of the company by enforcing a writ of 
sequestration.
74
 TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra
75
 is a similar case 
                                                 
71
 799 A.2d 298 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). In the case of C.F. Trust, Inc. v First Flight 
Ltd. Partnership 580 S.E.2d at 811, the Virginia Supreme Court applied the doctrine 
to an incorporated limited partnership. For a list of cases where outsider veil piercing 
has been permitted in a number of states in the US, see footnote 32 in L. Heilman, n 
68 above, 623, G. Crespi, “The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate 
Standards” (1990-1991) 16 Journal of Corporation Law 33, 55-69  and specifically in 
the case of corporate groups, see R. Thompson, “Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study” (1990-1991) 76 Cornell Law Review 1036, 1056-1057 at footnote 
111. 
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 An entity which is similar to the private limited company by shares in the UK. 
73
 [1933] Ch. 935. 
74
 RSC, Ord.45, r.5. See Hospital for Sick Children v Walt Disney Productions Inc. 
[1968] Ch. 52. 
75
 [1992] 2 All ER 245; [1992] 1 WLR 231. Here, the veil was lifted to enable a 
business creditor of a director of a company to exercise a Mareva order (now a 
commercial injunction) against the company, even though it was accepted that the 
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involving a Mareva injunction. Meanwhile, Jones v Lipman
76
 concerned the creditor 
of a shareholder and director of a company who was entitled to an order of specific 
performance against such shareholder/director and the company, breach of such order 
naturally entitling the creditor to a right to damages against the company which would 
be paid out of its assets.
77
 
 
Once it is understood that entity shielding is not a sufficient or necessary consequence 
of separate legal personality and that both of these innovations are distinct and in fact, 
that the former is proprietary in nature representing a bedrock feature of corporate law 
inasmuch as it cannot be simulated or displaced by a nexus of contracts in the absence 
of exponential costs,
78
 an argument emerges that applying the doctrine of piercing the 
veil to set it aside may be misconceived. The soundness of this reasoning becomes 
stronger when one considers that in the case of other organisations or legal institutions 
where weak and strong entity shielding are present or emulated, both are extremely 
resistant to being set aside, sometimes to the point that such a stance is prohibited 
outright. For example, in the Scottish partnership, it is not possible for the creditors of 
a partner to execute the diligences of (i) attachment (formerly poinding) over the 
corporeal moveable assets
79
 of the partnership,
80
 (ii) inhibition and adjudication over 
the corporeal or incorporeal heritable property
81
 of the partnership or (iii) arrestment 
and furthcoming over the incorporeal moveable assets
82
 of the partnership – and it is 
by no means the case that each of these premises are based on the separate legal 
                                                                                                                                            
creditor had no cause of action against the company, on the grounds that there was 
otherwise a risk that the assets of the company would be dissipated. 
76
 [1962] 1 All ER 442. 
77
 See Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 and H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (30
th
 
edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) paras. 27-082 – 27-083. 
78
 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1339 and 1340-1343; J. Armour and M. Whincop, n 
18 above. 
79
 Tangible personal property. 
80
 Section 10(1) of the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002. 
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 Real property. 
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personality of the partnership.
83
 Instead, creditors of the partner may only arrest the 
share of the partner in the partnership, but such a diligence is ineffective to convey 
title to those assets to the creditor.
84
 This begs the question as to how the courts would 
have treated any plea to apply the doctrine to set aside entity shielding if the 
organisations in Gilford Motor Co., Lipman, Kensington International, The 
“Tjaskemolen”, Van Hoogstraten and other cases had been Scottish fixed-term 
partnerships rather than incorporated companies? It is submitted that the weak and 
strong entity shielding features of the fixed-term partnership would not have been 
removed to enable the creditors of the partners to take title to, or seize, the assets of 
the organisation through the technique of outsider reserve veil piercing. Likewise, in 
the case of the English partnership of fixed duration, it is submitted that the matter 
would be even more clear-cut. It would resolutely fail to arise on the ground that the 
doctrine could not be plead since it would be misconceived to do so bearing in mind 
the absence of any personhood in the case of the English partnership. 
 
The logic in harnessing the doctrine for the purposes of removing entity shielding is 
further strained when one considers that other legal institutions such as joint property 
in Scots law
85
 harbour no exceptions which have the role of empowering a creditor of 
a joint proprietor to execute diligence over the joint proprietor’s share. A joint 
proprietor does not own a common pro indiviso share in the joint property and so the 
joint assets are clearly segregated from that person’s personal asset pool. Each 
individual joint proprietor has no power of alienation over his/her notional ‘share’ and 
the joint property belongs on a unitary basis to the persons who are joint proprietors, 
from time to time.
86
 To that extent, the title is ‘elastic’, since if one joint proprietor 
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 P. Hemphill, n 28 above, 227. 
84
 See Erskine III, 3.24., G. Gretton, ‘Who Owns Partnership Property?’ (1987) 
Juridical Review 176, P. Hemphill, n 28 above, 228. The partnership funds are joint 
property, vested by and in the partners, as joint trustees in the first place for payment 
of the partnership debts, Bell, Commentaries, II, 613 (4
th
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creditors (Commissioners of Treasury v M’Nair, Faculty Collection, 14 Feb, 1809). 
85
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86
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dies, the others take the benefit of the deceased’s notional ‘share’. The unitary nature 
of the title ensures that it is not possible for the creditors of an individual joint 
proprietor to take a right in security or charge over that member’s share or undertake 
diligence over that share.
87
 Likewise, in the case of the trust in English law
88
 and 
Scots law,
89
 the personal creditors or trustees in bankruptcy of trustees are unable to 
take title or seize the assets of the trust estate. In Scotland, in the absence of equity, 
the trustee enjoys the real right of dominium in the trust fund/estate, but it is treated as 
a separate trust/fiduciary patrimony from the trustee’s personal patrimony and so is 
unavailable to his/her personal creditors. The salience of this point is evidenced by the 
historical data which underscores the significance of the trust device in the 
commercial sphere in the context of the eighteenth and nineteenth century joint stock 
corporation and the institution of joint property for the purposes of the Scottish 
partnership.  
 
In light of these insights, an argument materialises that by applying the doctrine to 
enable the personal or commercial creditors of shareholders or directors to secure the 
assets of the company, the limited liability company is being placed at a competitive 
disadvantage to the Scottish fixed-term partnership, the English fixed-term 
partnership, the Scottish legal institution of joint property and the English law and 
Scots law trust. It is self-evident that the partnership form can be used to run a 
business, but so can the institutions of joint property and trust be harnessed by persons 
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 K. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (Butterworths/Law Society of Scotland, 
1996) at para. 35. 
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 Crane v Drake (1708) 2 Vern. 616, Ellis’s Case (1742) 1 Atk. 101, Howard v 
Jemmet (1763) 3 Burr. 1369, Farr v Newman (1792) 4 Term Rep 621, 645 per 
Ashhurst J and Duncan v Cashin (1875) LR 10 CP 554. See “Trust and Corporation” 
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edition, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007), para. 43.3 at p. 567. See also s. 283(3)(a) 
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 Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43; Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 1985, s 33(1).  
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as a means of engaging in enterprise. The general accessibility of the doctrine for 
these purposes leaves the law open to the accusation that it is incoherent in the 
commercial context. In itself, the existence of such incoherence may not be wholly 
objectionable, provided that particularly meaningful reasons can be identified for 
singling out the corporation for such special treatment. However, it is submitted that 
one is stretched to detect any merit in applying the doctrine in this fashion, 
particularly when one considers that entity shielding is one of the proprietary 
cornerstones of the corporation which underpins the facilitation and ease of transfer of 
shares thus enabling the creation of a highly stable secondary securities market.
90
 
Further, if one enables the doctrine to be applied as a means of setting aside entity 
shielding, this would result in an increase in corporate borrowing costs. The creditors 
of the company would be deprived of a straightforward means of pricing the cost of 
credit in order to offset the risk that the creditors of shareholders and others would 
take priority over their contractual claims. 
 
The argument that entity shielding should not be subjected to disapplication in terms 
of the doctrine on piercing the corporate veil gains further support when one looks 
beyond the boundaries of company law to other areas of law. As Armour has argued, 
other legal institutions which are allied (in the sense of dealing with corporate 
enterprise) to corporate law but operate outside its field of application, perform 
functions in the mould of property law which are alternatives to the piercing the veil 
doctrine.
91
 For example, certain institutions enable the creditors of shareholders or 
directors of corporations to seize or secure the company’s assets where they have 
been transferred from the shareholder or the director to the company. These 
‘undervalue transactions’ laws apply in the context of personal insolvency, e.g. where 
the assets of an individual or corporate shareholder or director are transferred to the 
company within a particular period
92
 prior to the onset of the personal insolvency of 
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 H. Hansmann et al, n 9 above, 1350. 
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 J. Armour and M. Whincop, n 18 above, 448-462. 
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 In English law, in terms of section 341(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986, the ‘relevant 
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the shareholder or director.
93
 However, regardless of the state of solvency of the 
individual shareholder or director, English law enables any transfer of assets from 
such persons to a company to be challenged in terms of section 423 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 where such transaction is entered into at undervalue and a party has been 
prejudiced as a result. The case of Dornoch v Westminster International BV
94
 is a 
good example of this process at work. Here, the court ordered that an asset transferred 
at undervalue from one company to another in the same corporate group be conveyed 
to the nominee of a party who had been deliberately prejudiced by, and a victim of, 
the transaction. In Dornoch, the victim of the transaction was an insurance company, 
but the tenor of the language of section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is sufficiently 
wide to enable creditors who are prejudiced by a conveyance to seek relief.
95
 Whilst 
Scots law does not travel the same distance as English law, there are common laws 
based on the Actio Pauliana of the Roman law.
96
 Like English law, these rules do not 
require the shareholder or director to have entered into an official bankruptcy 
proceeding, but they do require a creditor to demonstrate that the shareholder or 
director was absolutely insolvent in the sense that their liabilities exceeded their assets 
at the point in time at which the transfer of the assets took place (or that the result of 
that transfer was the occurrence of such absolute insolvency).
97
 Such laws when 
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analysed in their entirety operate as functional equivalents
98
 of the doctrine on 
piercing the corporate veil. Indeed, it is suggested that they are more certain and 
stronger in their scope of application and the protection which they afford. For that 
reason, the point is advanced that these ‘undervalue transactions’ laws are sound 
alternatives to the doctrine which furnish further support for the contention that the 
doctrine should not be applied to set aside entity shielding. 
 
The law of agency is another functional equivalent of the doctrine on piercing the 
corporate veil. In certain circumstances, it may render a company liable to the 
personal creditors of the shareholders or directors of that company where the former 
is ruled to be the principal of the shareholders or directors as agents. The personal 
creditors of the shareholders or directors could seek recourse against the company’s 
assets where the company is deemed to be vicariously liable in tort/delict for the 
actions or omissions of the former.
99
 It is also possible for an agency relationship to 
arise in a contractual situation where a shareholder or director is held to be an 
unauthorised agent
100
 of the company as principal. If the principal is deemed to have 
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subsequently ratified (by the nature of its conduct)
101
 the agent’s actings in seeking to 
commit the principal to a contract with third parties, the principal will be bound on a 
retrospective basis from the moment the contract was concluded as if the agent had 
authority to commit to the contract at that time.
102
  
 
In the case of corporate groups where the parent is the single or majority shareholder 
of a subsidiary company, there are further mechanisms which operate as functional 
equivalents of the doctrine. First, there are the common law and statutory devices of 
de facto and shadow
103
 directorships. A person is deemed to be a de facto director if 
he/she/it undertakes the function of director, although not formally appointed as 
such.
104
 Moreover, the person must purport to act as a director, may require to be held 
out as such and must have real influence over the decision-making process of the 
relevant company.
105
 This can be contrasted with the statutory concept of the shadow 
directorship where a person does not purport to act as a director, but is treated as such 
on the basis that he/she/it exercises a real influence in the corporate affairs of the 
relevant company.
106
 The notions of de facto and shadow directorships are 
theoretically available to enable a creditor of a shareholder (which is a parent 
company) to sue a subsidiary company on the basis that the latter is a de facto or 
shadow director of the former and that it breached its statutory duties as a de facto or 
shadow director
107
 as a means of holding the latter personally liable. Whilst a breach 
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of the subsidiary’s duties as a de facto or shadow director of the parent company is 
not owed directly by it as a director to a creditor of a company,
108
 there is nothing to 
stop a creditor of the parent company from acquiring shares of the parent company 
where it is publicly listed and then raising statutory derivative proceedings on behalf 
of the parent against the subsidiary company as directors for breach of duty.
109
 
Further, if the subsidiary is deemed to be a de facto or shadow director, its assets will 
be available to creditors of the parent company in liquidation if a liquidator is able to 
show that the subsidiary company engaged in wrongful trading in breach of section 
214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Whilst it would be particularly unusual for a 
subsidiary company to have a sufficient degree of influence over a parent company or 
other companies in a corporate group for that matter to satisfy the common law and/or 
statutory concepts of de facto and/or shadow directorships, it is nevertheless 
worthwhile to underline the potential significance of these provisions. 
 
Secondly, in the context of a corporate group situation, the doctrines of ‘enterprise 
liability’
110
 may be invoked as a means of offering relief to creditors in various states 
in the USA. For example, in cases such as Gartner v Snyder
111
 and Pan Pacific Sash 
& Door Co. v Greendale Park, Inc.,
112
 on the basis of the notion of ‘enterprise 
liability’, creditors of one corporation within a corporate group were held to be 
entitled to reach the assets of other corporations within those groups or the collective 
assets of the group itself. Control by one corporation of another is insufficient for the 
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establishment of enterprise liability and instead it is incumbent upon a creditor to 
demonstrate a high degree of unity of interests between the companies to the extent 
that it is clear that they did not exist separately on a de facto basis. Moreover, such 
liability will only attach if the result of continuing to ascribe distinctive status to the 
corporations would lead to injustice.
113
 Of course, in the UK, an attempt to import 
enterprise liability via the label of the ‘single economic unit’ construct failed in 
Adams v Cape Industries plc.
114
 Nevertheless, it is possible that the notion of 
enterprise liability performs a useful function in the context of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability where it may be available to enable involuntary tort creditors (such 
as injured employees) to seek recourse against the assets of another company within 
the corporate group or a contractor of a debtor company.
115
 However, as a result of 
rapid technological innovations and market techniques such as outsourcing, 
franchising, dealership networking and privatisation, organisations have vertically 
disintegrated their production processes with linkages maintained between those 
organisations via contract-based links, rather than equity-based nexuses.
116
 The 
challenges confronting the enterprise liability model is that its coverage is limited to 
equity based, rather than contract based, models. For jurists such as Teubner and 
others,
117
 the adaptation of notions of ‘network enterprise’ liability into a legal system 
may amount to more satisfactory organising frameworks for the purposes of enabling 
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entity shielding to be disregarded along the whole strata of corporate groups, rather 
than simply in the case of the subsidiary/parent relationship. The concept’s attraction 
lies in the fact that it affords a means of compensating for some of the negative 
implications of the operations of corporate groups as it covers non-equity based 
contractual networks amongst corporations within a group, whereas the enterprise 
liability model is purely equity-based, i.e. de facto, rather than legal control, is the 
hallmark of the network liability model. Suffice to say for the purposes of this paper 
that there is limited recognition of such a notion within modern legal systems, albeit 
that academics are teasing out the possibility of achieving some form of normative 
reorganisation of private law institutions as a means of extending its scope of 
application. 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the striking characteristics of the academic commentary on the doctrine on 
piercing the veil of incorporation is the general absence of any systematized analysis 
of the circumstances in which the doctrine is, or ought to be, harnessed as a means of 
disregarding the entity shielding function of organisational law to impose liability on 
corporations for the debts or claims of their shareholders, beneficial shareholders or 
directors. The principal exception is Bainbridge who refers to this process as ‘outsider 
reverse veil piercing’. Bainbridge has argued for the abolition of the doctrine outright 
and has rightly criticised its application to effect outsider reverse veil piercing on the 
grounds that other shareholders of the corporation are unjustly prejudiced by its 
operation.
118
 Whilst this is a useful contribution to the debate, it is submitted that the 
application of the doctrine in outsider reverse veil piercing cases can be subjected to 
much more forceful criticisms on doctrinal grounds. The revelation that the current 
law places the registered company at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis (i) the 
Scottish legal institution of joint property and the English law and Scots law trusts 
when applied in a commercial context and (ii) the Scottish and English fixed-term 
partnership, functions to supply more forceful justificatory foundations for the 
abolition of the doctrine as regards its engagement as a means of removing entity 
shielding. The relevance of other areas of law which supply functional equivalents is 
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also suggestive of the existence of robust alternatives. Further, the strength of the 
combination of recently introduced statutory innovations such as the wrongful trading 
provisions in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and historical common law and 
statutory concepts such as de facto and shadow directorships demonstrate that the 
territory once occupied by the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has been 
encroached upon and with justification that territory should be abandoned and left to 
these functional equivalents and alternative concepts to cultivate. For all of these 
reasons, it is argued that there are compelling doctrinal justifications for the 
proposition that the common law doctrine on disregarding the corporate veil ought to 
be constrained by the judiciary so that it operates within much more restricted 
parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
